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We use a Swedish sickness insurance reform to show that among married couples a partner’s 
benefit level affects spousal labour supply.  The spousal elasticity of sick days with respect to 
the partner’s benefit is estimated to be 0.4,  which is about one-fourth of the own labor supply 
elasticity. It is argued the main part of this effect is an insurance income effect. 
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The disincentive effects  of social  insurance systems  on individual labour supply  are well 
documented,  but  knowledge  how  they  affect  family  labour  supply  is  scarcer.  We  use  a 
Swedish reform in the sickness insurance system to investigate if an increase in a partner’s 
benefit  level  spills  over to  spousal labour supply.  In theory, for  couples  with  a common 
household budget such an effect operates through an income effect which consists of three 
components: 1) an insurance income effect which arises since the partner’s higher benefit 
level alters the cost of future illness by the partner.
1 If leisure is a normal good this will 
increase spousal sick reporting regardless of whether the partner directly reacts to the reform; 
2) a  direct  income  effect  since  an  increased  benefit  level  can  change  the  partner's  sick 
reporting and thus also his/her earnings. The sign of this effect is a priori unknown since the 
partner’s earnings change can go in either direction, and 3) a joint leisure effect that occurs if 
a couple wants to spend more leisure time together.
2 Decomposing a disincentive effect into 
different mechanism has proven to be empirically difficult (Autor and Duggan 2007).  
To date results indicate that  partners’ sickness insurance spill over to  spousal labor 
supply; the spousal elasticity of sick days with respect to the partner’s benefit is estimated to 
0.36 (own labour supply elasticity in the unemployment insurance is close to 1; see Krueger 
and Meyer 2002). The major part of this effect is an insurance income effect.  
 
The reform and data 
Sweden has a compulsory publicly administered sickness insurance program funded primarily 
through a payroll tax levied on employers. Income compensation constitutes the major part of 
this program, though the replacement rate has varied over time. In December 1987 it was 
increased for spells lasting less than a week and the waiting day was abolished. For details of 
the  current  system  and  the  1987  reform,  see  Pettersson-Lidbom  and  Skogman  Thoursie 
(2010). 
Central government workers (16 percent of the workforce) were not affected by the 
reform in 1987, having a 92 percent replacement rate before and after the reform. In contrast, 
                                                 
1 This is related to the added-worker effect studied in the unemployment insurance literature.  A central thesis  
explored is the degree to which the incentive for the spouse to increase labour supply when the partner becomes 
unemployed diminishes with the partner’s unemployment benefit level (see Ashenfelter 1980, Heckman and 
MaCurdy 1980, and Lundberg 1985). Cullen and Gruber (2000) find that the labour supply of wives to 
unemployed husbands is affected by the husbands’ unemployment insurance.     
2 Or that spousal sick reporting decreases if the partner increases his/her sick reporting and can do more of the 
household work. 2 
 
after the reform for local government workers (39 percent) compensation increased from 90 to 
100 percent. Unfortunately, the exact increase for workers in the private sector (45 percent) is 
unknown because the pre-replacement rate was based on job characteristics and collective 
agreements not available to us.  
We match information on start- and end dates for all sick spells in Sweden from the 
Swedish  National  Insurance  Board  with  information  from  the  register  LINDA,  a 
representative register data set covering 3.3 percent of the Swedish population.
3 The data set 
analyzed exclusively treats  married  workers employed in the central governmental sector  
from 1986 to 1990 using a difference-in-difference estimator.
4 Treated are spouses to partners 
who were affected by the reform; untreated are spouses to partners who were unaffected by 
the reform. The sample includes  individuals married to partners who were  affected by the 
reform, excluding individuals married to partners who were not affected.  The final sample is 
an unbalanced panel of all 18,819 individuals observed in 1986,  with an average occurrence 
of 3.35 years. Table 1 displays average values by group before and after the reform. No effect 
is found for the incidence, but durations are prolonged. No big c ompositional changes are 
found, only age showing a slight increase after the reform.
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Spells  54 606  47 437  17 891  15 589   
Notes: Columns (1)–(4) report standard deviations in parentheses. For the DD-estimates, OLS standard errors clustered on 
individuals are displayed in parentheses. Duration is right censored at 50 days and measured in logs to deal with outliers. 
 
                                                 
3 See Edin and Fredriksson (2000) for a general description of LINDA. 
4 We necessarily limit the analysis to individuals aged 20–64 with a yearly income above SEK 6000,  since 
workers with less cannot claim insurance benefits.  
5 We have checked average compositional values for the individual sample. No statistically significant 
differences prevail. 3 
 
To motivate our differences-in-difference strategy we display the development of log duration 
for treated an untreated in Figure 1. The trends are similar between the groups up until 1987,  
but after the reform the duration increases for those treated relative to the untreated. 
 





























The direct effect of the reform is investigated by Pettersson-Lidbom and Skogman Thoursie 
(2010). They show that the reform increased the incidence by 11 percent while it decreased 
duration. This is not surprising since the reform made it less costly for a worker to be absent 
for short periods once the waiting day was abolished. In fact, the net effect of the reform on 
the total number of days of sickness absence was a 3 percent reduction. However, it important 
to note these types of incentives were not present for the population we studied in this paper 
since they were only indirectly affected. 
 
Estimations and results 
Our first analysis explores the distributional effects on duration by estimating the following 
linear probability difference-in-differences (DD) model: 
 
    P(Yigt ≥ s) = ʱ + λt + πDgt + δs(DgtPostt) + uigt,   (1) 
 4 
 
in which Yigt takes the value 1 if spousal i is married to a treated partner (g=1 and 0 otherwise) 
at time t and has a sick spell of at least s days (s=1, 2, …, 100). Time effects are represented 
by λt   (t is defined as half-years), Dgt indicates whether the spouse is married to a treated 
partner or not and Postt takes the value 1 from December 1987 (0 otherwise). δs measures the 
average reform effect on the probability that sick spells lasted at least s days. If the reform 
affected spouses’ probability to start a new spell, we expect a positive DD-estimate at the 
threshold  1,  i.e.,  δ1>0.  If  duration  was  affected,  we  should  obtain  significant  effects  at 
thresholds of higher orders. 
Figure 2 displays the DD-estimates. The reform had no impact on the probability to start 
a sick spell; the effect is insignificant at the threshold 1. But it increased the duration of 
ongoing spells up to around 40 days, with the largest effects for spells fewer than eight days; 
those days for which the reform de facto changed the replacement rate. One explanation for 
the lack of effect on incidence is that starting a new spell appears to mark a worse career 
signal than merely continuing an ongoing spell with an additional day. It clearly can be more 
costly for the employer to adjust work plans and find a substitute for a new sick case than for 
a person who has already been on sick leave for a while.  
 
Figure 2. Estimated reform effects on the probability that a spell exceeds a given length  
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Note: Standard errors are clustered on a time-group level. 
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The fact that incidence is unaffected by the reform increases our confidence in analyzing 
positive spells.  We proceed to right-censor these at 50 days to avoid influences from extreme 
outliers, employing  the following DD regression model:  
 
    Yigt = ʱ + t + βXit + πDgt + δ(DgtPostt) + εigt,  (2) 
 
Yigt is log duration of sick spells,  and Xit are individual covariates included to both improve 
precision and control for any potential composition changes.
6 The total causal reform effect 
on duration, δ, measures whether spouses to treated partners changed in durations after the 
reform relative to spouses with untreated partners. We decompose this total income effect into 
three parts. First, we ignore spells for couples that overlap in time (8.4 percent of the total 
sample) in  order to  evaluate the relative importance of a joint  leisure effect.  Second, we 
separate  out  the  direct  income  effect  by  estimating  equation  (2)  controlling  for  partners’ 
income.
7 Since partners’ income is endogenous, we instrument this variable with the partners’ 
pre-reform income in 1986 using 2SLS. 
The results are reported in the first column of Table 2. The estimated total effect reveal 
that spousal duration significantly increased by 3.2 percent when partners received a higher 
sickness benefit. Omitting couples with overlapping cases doesn’t change this result, making 
it more reasonable to  ignore the endogeneity with  joint leisure.
 When  we control for the 
partner's income the effect is reduced to 2.6 percent,  implying that the direct income effect is 
0.6 percent.
8 We conclude that  generally the insurance income effect is highly relevant for 
spousal labor supply. 
To quantity the effect we  reestimate the model using only treated spouses  married to 
local governmental workers,  as we know that their replacement rate increased by 11 percent.
9 
The estimated effects are reported in the second column of Table 2. The total reform effect is 
4 percent,  implying an elasticity of spousal sick reporting with respect to the partner’s benefit 
of 0.36. The insurance effect is estimated to be 2.5 percent implying, an insurance elasticity of 
0.23.  
 
                                                 
6 The covariates are age, whether the spouse is a wife, living in an urban area and household size. Including these 
covariates hardly change the estimated reform effect. 
7 It should be noted that a direct income effect is potentially relevant because we found evidence that partners’ 
income was affected by the reform. 
8 The instrument has a t-value of 537 in the first stage.  
9 For workers above the income cap the change in replacement rate is smaller. This group is less than 5 percent 
of the sample,  and the reform effect is unchanged when they are excluded. 6 
 
Table 2: Differences-in-difference estimates of the reform on log duration 
  Full sample  Local government workers 




Ignoring cases with overlap 
 











Relative size of insurance IE 
(share of total effect) 
71.2  62.5 
Observations  135 523  81 620 
Robust SE clustered on firm. All models control for county, age, sex and household size. When ignoring overlapping sick 
cases the sample size is 124,165 for the full sample and 74,214 for local government workers.  
 
 
Finally, we estimate separate reform effects for low- and high income partners. The results 
(available from the authors upon request) show that spouses of  low income partners reacted 
more to the reform than those of high income partners. This strengthens the finding that the 
insurance income effect is important, which is not surprising inasmuch as the need to insure 
against future economic shocks is likely to be higher for low income families. 
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